

NEUTRALITY: A HUNGARIAN VIEW*

by

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I. Preliminary Remarks

The author of this paper, who is expected to outline the Hungarian view, is in a difficult position. The organizers of the conference have, no doubt, invited experts from various countries to hear from them many-sided and differentiated viewpoints in connection with the role of the neutral countries in preserving European peace and security. Besides the anticipated views of approval, the organizers would obviously welcome some critical remarks as well. But in the recent past, both official and non-official Hungarian public opinion have developed such a positive picture of the activities of the neutral countries and voiced practically such non-critical views that the following paper might perhaps look one-sided and biased; it, however, — I think — reflects the truth.

It is an interesting feature of the neutrality issue, at least for an international lawyer, that neither official nor nonofficial Hungarian public opinion distinguishes among the four countries as to whether they are legally bound to maintain their neutrality or not. The last time the legal aspects of neutrality were discussed was when Austria wanted to regulate its relations with EEC. It then became obvious that the specific obligations of neutrality can be interpreted so differently that their contents cannot be defined precisely. However, since these problems are not relevant any more, the legal aspects have no bearing on the subject any more. This, of course, does not mean that this problem may not surface again in case of some concrete issues in the future. Legal problems come up mostly when political conflicts arise among States. But since there is no such conflict at this moment between Hungary and any of the neutral countries in Europe, nobody is going to raise the legal aspects of neutrality. It can further be observed that the four countries are not conducting their neutral policies because they are under a legal obligation to do so but because such a policy appears to be in their basic internal or external political interest.

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Although neutrality is originally a military conception, the military aspects of this status are not emphasized in recent discussions in Hungary either. Naturally, we consider it highly favorable that no NATO troops are stationed in the immediate vicinity of the Hungarian frontiers; and we know, of course, that Austria's Western neighbours also appreciate the fact that Warsaw Pact units are at a proper distance from them. Apart from this, military aspects have long been overshadowed by purely foreign political economic or cultural considerations, which is a clear sign of the fact that the beneficial effects of *détente* still exist.

What really matters now to the Hungarians, is that at the other side of the border between East and West there are some countries which — although unambiguously belonging to the West — consistently pursue a policy of national interest and not a policy furthering bloc interests, i.e. the interests of other States which are for example outside Europe, have much a large population and incomparably larger military and economic capabilities. Such a policy could probably be considered a sign of a healthy pluralism in international relations and undoubtedly contributes to the democratization of these relations. It is extremely important for us that we should not face a rigid, hostile bloc of capitalist countries. This fact makes it certainly easier to pursue our national interests, too, both in foreign and internal policies.

Apart from the above-mentioned considerations, the views of official or non-official public opinion in Hungary on the four European neutral States are determined mostly by bilateral factors. People are not inclined to generalize about the policies of the neutral countries as such; they prefer to draw conclusions from what now these countries act in their bilateral relations with Hungary, from the level of cooperation they are ready to develop with us. As will be seen from this paper, this level is different from country to country.

2. Public Opinion

Non-official public opinion regarding the neutral States has always been highly positive. It is Austria that tops the list in this regard. The reasons can easily be understood. Due to geographic proximity and the common historic past, Hungarians have always had ample opportunity to get acquainted with the Austrian people and with the foreign policy of that country. Strangely enough, in the region East to the River Lajta, the past is evoking mostly positive memories, although schoolchildren, in their studies of the history of the 18th and 19th centuries, inevitably learn that the Hapsburgs conducted a policy of oppression and that the two most important Hungarian independence movements fought against the Hapsburgs (1703–1711, 1848–1849). But as regards the grown-up population the neighboring State evokes different memories. And this change is not merely due to the seven decades that have passed between the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the present day but it is also due to a new approach developed by the Hungarian economic historians in the last fifteen years.

In their studies of the Monarchy, these historians have pointed out that, in spite of political subordination, being part of the Monarchy had been less unfavorable for Hungary than earlier judgments had concluded. This was particularly true of the period between the "Compromise" ("*Ausgleich*") in 1867 and World War I. In the course of this period, there emerged possibilities for the development of a comparatively significant Hungarian processing industry. The Hungarian industrial products could find their market within the Monarchy, on a comparatively large territory. In addition, the same currency was used in all parts of the Monarchy. Consequently, the Hungarian economy never struggled with currency problems (in contrast to certain periods following Hungarian independence).

Tourism of the early 1960s also had a favorable impact on public opinion. In this period it first became possible for considerable numbers of Hungarians to travel to the West. Naturally, their first stopover was Austria. Breaking with the severe isolationist policies of the 1950s, the Hungarian government, having the necessary means at its disposal, supported this tourism. Since the Hungarians were cordially welcomed in Austria, this country received favorable ratings in Hungarian public opinion. The fact that the Austrian living standard was comparatively high also played a role. Thus Hungarian tourists travelling to Austria got acquainted with a friendly, stable State, whose economy was in good shape.

It must also be borne in mind that up to the recent past it was the German language that was most widely spoken in Hungary — of course also due to Hungary's belonging to the Monarchy. Consequently, there were no serious linguistic obstacles to communication between the two nations.

A further essential factor is the advantageous image Austria enjoys in the Hungarian mass media. After getting beyond the conflicts of the years following 1956, there were practically no critical reports by the Hungarian press and radio on Austria. The Hungarian press is refraining from comments or critical remarks even in the case of unfavorable phenomena in Austria and is publishing only matter-of-fact information.

The neutral and independent policy Austria, of course, also contributed to the development of a positive attitude. This policy was personified during the last years in Chancellor Bruno Kreisky who enjoyed enormous popularity here. It became customary in Hungary to speak about the „K.u.K.” (Kreisky und Kádár) relationship.

As far as Finland is concerned, impressions in Hungarian public opinion are likewise favorable. Although, due to geographical distance and language reasons, relations with the Finnish people cannot be compared with those with the Austrians. Hungarians nevertheless cherish the kinship with the Finnish nation very vividly. Another important fact is the very warm welcome which Hungarian tourists have received in Finland. There emerged the feeling that Hungarian tourists were liked in Finland just because they were Hungarians. It would be difficult to find objective reasons behind this mutual affection. However, the foreign policy pursued by Finland since the Second World War has undoubtedly played an important role in this respect, too.

Probably Switzerland is in third place of the "popularity list". The favorable stereotype the Swiss enjoy in the world is also shared by Hungarians, who respect the Swiss as reliable, precise and diligent people. These are qualities which can earn a very high prestige for a people. This favorable image, however, is somewhat tarnished by the fact that, although foreigners visiting Switzerland are given a friendly welcome, it lacks the cordiality which other peoples show. Another shadow which falls on this favorable image is due to the fact that Hungarians have learned about the difficulties foreigners living in Switzerland have to cope with.

To Hungarian public opinion, Switzerland's internal policies are entirely unknown. Should a public opinion poll be taken today, Hungarians, in all probability, fail to be able to name a single Swiss politician. Hungarians however, regard Swiss neutrality with respect.

Sweden's image is similarly favorable. The high level of (social) security in that country is well known in Hungary. Opinions on social-democratic domestic policies — in spite of the fact that they are often accompanied with high taxes — are highly positive. Social democracy is among the concepts which enjoy the best resonance in Hungary. Besides Bruno Kreisky and Willy Brandt, Olof Palme, too, enjoys considerable popularity in Hungary.

Naturally, the positive opinions outlined above are not primarily or solely the result of the neutral policies pursued by the countries concerned, but, as I have already briefly indicated, other circumstances also play a role. The fact, however, that Hungarian mass media continuously present a highly favourable picture of these countries, is obviously related to the neutral policies they pursue. It is likewise due to their neutral policies that the public statements of the political leaders of the four countries do not contain any disapproval, at least in the last decade and a half, of Hungary.

It is an interesting feature of the over-all picture that has developed in Hungarian public opinion that ideological differences, namely the fact that all four countries have another type of social system, does not play an essential role in this regard. Even those parts of public opinion which declare themselves the most active adherents of socialism accept the above-mentioned countries with their different socio-political systems. Even they do not feel that those differences can essentially influence the development of relations between peoples. An eventual reassessment of other non-neutral nations in Hungary would, in all probability, rank them without much attention to the fact that they belong to another social system. That international antagonisms and the relations between groups of countries belonging to two different social systems influence the subconscious attitude, is of course a different matter. Similarly, Western views on Hungary (or socialism) do not remain indifferent to such differences either.

3. Bilateral Relations

In the following analysis, factors that are not directly related to the policy of neutrality will again be discussed. On the other hand, neutrality is one of the determining factors in the development of bilateral relations as well. To the best of my knowledge, however, in these relations, especially in intergovernmental diplomatic negotiations, little mention is made of neutrality itself. In most cases, contacts are established to tackle more concrete problems.

a) Austria

Our bilateral relations with Austria have become intensive and beneficial to both sides in the period following the „Second Compromise” (*„Zweiter Ausgleich”*), after several years of international political tensions that followed the events of 1956 in Hungary came to an end. The Austrian Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky first visited Hungary in 1964. In 1965, this visit was returned by his Hungarian counterpart, János Péter. The first meetings between Heads of State took place in 1967 – 1969. However, as Federal Chancellor, Kreisky visited Hungary only as late as 1973. Another three years had to elapse until János Kádár received and accepted an Austrian invitation. Since then, however, meetings between the Heads of State, Heads of Government, and /or on the ministerial level have become more frequent and regular. In 1977, President Kirchschläger visited Budapest, while in 1979 Hungarian Head of State Pál Losonczi traveled to Vienna. We consider it very important that we recently had the opportunity to receive the new Austrian Chancellor, Fred Sinowatz, who paid his first foreign visit after he had succeeded Bruno Kreisky to Hungary. All these visits helped to intensify Austro-Hungarian relations. In Hungary, there is a very strong conviction that this process will continue in the years to come.

The same favorable assessment applies to the legally regulated relations as well. Among the bilateral treaties, the most important agreement concerns the abolition of the obligatory visa system. Other important treaties include consular, extradition, criminal-legal assistance, and cultural-scientific agreements, as well as an agreement on the equivalence of school certificates.

The present economic relations between the two countries are characterized by intensive trade. Our trade turnover with Austria is comparatively high. It is more than twice the turnover with the United States and one third of the turnover with the Federal Republic of Germany. This means an average 800 million dollars of total turnover; however, the Hungarian import share unfortunately only 60 to 80 per cent of this. It is for this reason that a free trade agreement with Austria would be important to Hungary. In 1976 it seemed that Austria was ready to sign such an agreement with Hungary. Prime Minister György Lázár proposed to Bruno Kreisky to conclude a free trade agreement that year. The answer given by the Austrian Chancellor was that his government “would give favorable

consideration to the proposal". This was also included in the joint communiqué issued on the talks between the two sides. In December 1976, however, during János Kádár's visit to Vienna, it became obvious that Austria was not willing to conclude an agreement along these lines, mainly because of alleged West German objections. This was all the more significant because Austria, as a member of EFTA and as a result of her free trade agreements with the European Communities, had become part of a big economic unit. Exports to this unit are causing increasingly serious problems for Hungarian foreign trade. It must be added here that Austrian tariff rates are higher than the rates of the West European countries or those of EEC. Trade with Austria is also somewhat hindered by the so-called countersigning ("Vidierungsvermerk") procedure which was introduced allegedly as a protection against dumping prices. Although this procedure is a formal one, it undoubtedly belongs to non-tariff trade barriers. Moreover, in some individual cases Austrian authorities are granting tariff concessions to Hungarian exporters.

In spite of these problems, the Hungarian appraisal of Austrian foreign trade policy is positive. Our Austrian partners belong to the most reliable and honest trade partners. Therefore, all our endeavors are aimed at extending economic relations. Nobody in Hungary now has reservations about Austria's above-mentioned free trade agreements with the European Communities. It was only in the early 1960s that a certain anxiety arose. At the time, there were speculations about the institutionalization of Austria's relations with West-European integration. The question of the interpretation of Austria's neutrality was raised. More specifically, the issue of whether this neutrality should go beyond the military sphere or not was discussed. It was the general conviction in Hungary that already in peacetime a permanently neutral State must follow a political line which guarantees that in case of armed conflict it can preserve its neutrality. In Hungary at that time opinion was held that Austria's association with EEC was incompatible with her neutrality.

Although association does not yet mean "joining" EEC, and though formally it would not infringe Austria's on neutrality, factually, however, it would. As part of EEC's customs union, the Austrian national market would practically be united with the market of the European Community. This in turn would result in further economic integration with the members of the Community, first of all with the Federal Republic of Germany. The over 50% share of Austrian foreign trade with EEC would in all probability increase further to the disadvantage of the East-European countries. The dependence of the Austrian economy would considerably increase the influence of the governing bodies of the Community. At that time some even raised the issue of the violation of the so-called "*Anschluss ban*" of the Austrian State Treaty (Art. 4.), which, however, was an obvious exaggeration.

Later, it was learned in Hungary with dissatisfaction that, since the mid-1960s, intensive negotiations had been held between representatives of EEC and the Austrian government. According to our information, by

the time of the Italian veto on June 30, 1967, those negotiations had come to a stage where preliminary agreement had been reached on Austria's admission to the Common Market's customs union. This meant that Austria was ready to adopt EEC's external customs rates. What is more, under this agreement, she was to adjust her agricultural policy to that of the Common Market.

Naturally, all these events already belong to the past; I mention them only for the sake of historical truth. The change in the Hungarian attitude towards the free trade agreement since that time is partly due to a highly favourable change in Austria's foreign policy towards Hungary. But it is also a result of a considerable modification of the Hungarian approach to West-European integration itself. At the end of the fifties and during the following years, the European Communities had been branded by the Hungarian press and also in some official statements, simply as the European economic base of NATO. Later, however, Hungary accepted the existence of the Common Market as a "reality" and — especially in the framework of the CMEA — has even shown readiness to enter into institutionalized relations with the European Community. It became obvious that the Community did not pose such a political danger to the development of East-West relations as it had earlier been assumed.

Hungarian politicians and diplomats who are in personal contact with their Austrian counterparts have a favorable impression of them. According to their opinion, Austrian politicians serve the national interest of their country in such a way that they are paying considerable attention to the interests of other European countries as well, in spite of the fact that some of them, Hungary for instance, belong to a different social system. A recurrent adjective in Hungarian statements about the relations between the two countries is "exemplary". This means that Austro-Hungarian relations might be a model for the relations between all countries which have different political systems. It is especially important to underline this fact since, as is widely known, the leaders of the ruling Austrian Socialist Party do not share at all the ideology of the Communist Parties. An incident characteristic of this position occurred when, during his 1973 visit, Mr. Kreisky refused to see Mr. Kádár at the Central Committee headquarters. Nor was Mr. Kreisky willing to enter into inter-party relations. Nevertheless, the visit was highly successful. Subsequently, the Hungarian side also respected the SPÖ's standpoint according to which inter-State relations are to be distinguished from inter-party relations. It is interesting to note, however, that the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) was ready to establish such relations. Its Secretary-General has already been to Hungary some time ago; its Chairman Dr. Alois Mock just visited Hungary in January 1984.

This evolution leads to the conclusion, that Hungary too, accepts the viewpoint that permanent neutrality does not mean neutralism and, as a consequence, the Austrian government cannot be expected to take a neutral stand on ideological issues. The democratic political system of Austria is respected in Hungary as well as is Austria's support for classical Western

values. Hungary gladly takes cognizance of the fact at the same time Austria respects the Hungarian political system and, in spite of the differences in the political systems of the two countries, is willing to maintain close and friendly relations with Hungary. It is my conviction that both nations benefit from this state of affairs in bilateral relations and that it greatly contributes to the preservation of peace and security and to the improvement of the quality of life in this part of the continent, which has suffered from so many conflicts in the past.

b) Finland

In the past decades, Hungarian-Finnish relations have also developed very positively. Here, too, something similar to the evolution of Austro-Hungarian relations occurred after the tensions following the events of 1956 had ceased to exist. In 1963, Mr. Urho Kekkonen first visited Hungary. In 1969, the Finnish President visited Hungary again. Although János Kádár first visited Finland only as late as 1973, this was not a negative sign, since Hungarian-Finnish relations had been developing well as the second half of the 1960s. It is not necessary here to list all the highly intensive contacts between the two States in the past decades. It is sufficient to recall that shortly after his election, President Koivisto visited Hungary as early as 1982, and János Kádár returned his visit already in 1983. The Hungarian press commented on this latter visit in superlatives and underlined the various manifestations of personal sympathy which developed between the two statesmen.

Finland is the other West-European country that was willing to sign an agreement with Hungary on the abolition of obligatory visas (Hungary submitted similar proposals to several other Western countries, including neutral and non-aligned countries, but failed to get a positive response). The ten-year economic industrial and technical-scientific agreements signed in 1974 are significant, as well as a treaty abolishing trade obstacles, which is practically a free trade agreement. In 1978, a bilateral treaty on abolishing dual taxation and in 1981, an agreement on criminal police matters were concluded.

Unfortunately, owing to geographical distance and to the characteristics of the industrial structure of the two countries, economic relations between Hungary and Finland are less intensive than political relations. Hungarian foreign trade with Finland reaches only one fifth of the volume with Austria, despite the fact that there are no administrative obstacles whatsoever to hinder the development of foreign trade. Nevertheless, our foreign trade experts appreciate very much the high level of development in certain processing industrial branches (such as the paper industry) and are trying to increase the volume of Finnish imports.

Also due to geographical distance, and because of the high Finnish price level, each year only about 4000–5000 Hungarian tourists have been visiting Finland in the recent past. From Finland, a similarly low number of tourists, 19,000–20,000, has traveled to Hungary. On the other hand an astonishingly high number of people are studying Hungarian in Finland,

attending day-time and evening university courses. The number of firms who are visiting the Hungarian Cultural and Scientific Center, founded in 1980 in Helsinki, is similarly high.

Like the relations established with their Austrian partners, relations between Hungarian and Finnish politicians and diplomats on different levels are truly exemplary. In Hungary, the opinion is held that these particularly fortunate relations between countries belonging to two distant regions of Europe have a positive effect on the overall security of Europe as well. It is otherwise of special importance for us that the political steps taken by the Hungarian government continuously meet with positive reactions from both Austria and Finland. It is evident that reactions in the neighborhood are always an essential factor for the development of the political strategy of a given country. Such favorable reactions are strengthening those tendencies in Hungary that have been taking shape in the course of more than a quarter of a century since 1956.

c) Switzerland

That Hungarian-Swiss relations are good, but not distinctly intensive, is due to Switzerland's special political system, her sophisticated federal structure. The interruption of relations in the period following 1956 lasted much longer than in the case of Austria or Finland. Only in the 1970s the Swiss government agreed to a *rapprochement* with Hungary. In 1978, Swiss Foreign Minister Pierre Aubert visited Hungary and the Swiss Finance Minister also came to Budapest. Two years later, then Foreign Minister Frigyes Puja returned the visit of his Swiss counterpart, and the Hungarian Ministers of Foreign Trade and of Finance also visited Switzerland.

In 1973, Hungary signed an economic agreement with Switzerland which, among other things, provided for the establishment of mixed committees. The existence of these committees contributed to the significant development of our economic relations — they are considerably more intensive than the political relations. In recent years, our foreign trade turnover with Switzerland has been the same that with the United States. The products of Swiss industry, highly developed in certain fields, are much in demand in Hungary. At present some 100 cooperation agreements between Hungarian and Swiss companies are in force; in this regard, Swiss industry is in second place, following the Federal Republic of Germany. Unfortunately, Hungary did not succeed in reaching a balance in her economic relations with Switzerland either. Hungarian exports cover only 60–70% of the annual imports from Switzerland.

Due to the Swiss federal system, there is no inter-State cultural agreement between the two countries. However, agreements were concluded instead between the Swiss and the Hungarian Academies of Sciences and also between the Hungarian Cultural Institution and its Swiss counterpart, although only as late as 1980.

I am convinced that the political relations have reached the existing level only because the Swiss government does not maintain particularly active relations with the rest of the world in general. Swiss foreign policy

does not aim at spectacular international initiatives. On the other hand, we hope that Hungarian-Swiss relations on different levels which were established in the past will continue for the benefit of both countries.

d) Sweden

Swedish-Hungarian contacts were the last to develop. The first (and only) high-level meeting took place only four years ago, when Deputy Premier József Marjai visited Stockholm. There are now plans for Olof Palme to visit Hungary in 1984. In addition, however, in recent years several Hungarian government members have visited Sweden and *vice versa*. That contacts are not particularly intensive reflects the fact that there are no open questions to solve in Swedish-Hungarian relations. Meetings between the two sides up to now have been highly successful. We are therefore entitled to hope that relations will further develop in the future.

In the economic field, the long-term trade agreement, signed in 1982, can be considered significant. Furthermore, mention is to be made of the agreement (signed also in 1982) which abolished double taxation, and of a legal assistance agreement signed in September 1983. The trade agreement removed several commercial obstacles between the two countries. However, the maintenance by Sweden of the import permit system against countries with a State monopoly in the field of trade still makes the economic relations somewhat difficult. Nevertheless, as in the case of Finland, geographical distance is the main reason why the volume of trade is not particularly high — the turnover between Hungary and Sweden is about the same as between Hungary and Finland.

As regards cultural relations, an agreement was concluded comparatively early. In 1969, an agreement was concluded between the Hungarian Institute of Cultural Relations and the Swedish Cultural Institute. In 1972, this was followed by a cooperation agreement between the Academies of Sciences of the two countries.

The relatively low level of tourism between the two countries is also related to geographical distance and to the high Swedish price level. In the past few years, some 6,000–7,000 Hungarian tourists visited Sweden, while the number of Swedish tourists to Hungary was between 30,000–32,000.

It must be remarked here that the Swedish system of granting visas is still lagging behind the Hungarian procedure (entry visas to Hungary are issued within 24 hours at our Embassies, while at border crossing points or at the airport entry visas can be obtained immediately). We would also welcome a bilateral consular agreement with Sweden.

4. Multilateral Relations

The role which the four neutral States are playing in securing peace and security in Europe, is given a highly favorable appraisal in Hungary. All the efforts made by these States to this end, especially in the last decade, have been greeted with great satisfaction in Hungary.

It is hardly necessary to enumerate all the well-known initiatives taken by the neutral countries to further promote *détente*. Suffice it to say that we consider the steps taken by the neutrals — many times in cooperation with non-aligned States — to be a qualitative change in the post-World War II period of European history. In the course of the Geneva phase and the CSCE follow-up conference we had already welcomed the first signs of the joint activity by those countries. However, it was during the Madrid meeting that the neutrals gave events a decisive impetus. It is a general conviction in Hungary that without the activities of the neutral and non-aligned countries, the Madrid meeting would have been a total failure. Four years ago, at the start of the talks, for well-known reasons, antagonism between East and West had been so severe that in Hungary many people lost their hope for a successful conclusion of the meeting. The first draft of a final document by the neutral and non-aligned States was an enormous help to the common cause.

As is known, however, conflicts were not settled at that time, and a new text had to be drafted. According to our view, this latter draft gave another impetus to the deadlocked conference. Though the drafts were of a compromise nature, we still thought that they would serve the interest of the international community. The members of the "n+n" groups drafted proposals not only on the basis of the lowest common denominator. Consequently, the final document of the Madrid meeting does not report only that the talks had eventually been concluded. The contents of this document provide a useful contribution to the development of European inter-State relations.

The members of the Hungarian delegation said that the representatives of the neutral States in Madrid had shown not only considerable good will and friendliness but very high professional competence too. In the course of the extremely difficult formal and informal negotiations, these representatives proved to be outstanding diplomats. Special appreciation was expressed for the heads of the Austrian and Swiss delegations, Mr. Ceska and Mr. Brunner.

It was observed by the participants of the Madrid conference that the neutral countries — which happened to belong to the smaller States of Europe — were looking for ways and means to take part in shaping the European political processes. Since Hungary does not belong to the bigger nations of Europe either, it followed these efforts with special satisfaction. According to our view, the participation of the neutral countries is not only significant from the point of view of their mediation activities, but also because they are making an important contribution to the democratization of international relations. It is clear that certain issues, such as the problems of strategic nuclear arms limitation, can only be solved by negotiations between the Great Powers. However, in practically all other fields, every State in Europe should participate in the solution of problems of common interest. Consequently, those institutional forms in which the smaller countries can express and represent their interests are highly

important, especially because these countries have political and cultural traditions of their own and represent significant human values.

The recent changes in world politics gave rise to grave concern in Hungary, since she is keenly interested in maintaining *détente*. There is no room here for a deeper analysis of the causes that led to these changes. But it became clear that political processes within the United States had taken a turn unfavorable for us at the end of the 1970s. The trend of the development of these processes has been, however, influenced by the behaviour of the States. In this regard, I think the role the neutral countries have been playing in recent years must not be underestimated. Their foreign policy has probably demonstrated to the Carter and Reagan Administrations that not only the East European countries were interested in *détente*, but also the smaller States in the West.

Naturally, the foreign policy of the neutral countries was not solely intended to influence the policy of a Western power. In many cases this foreign policy has affected the Socialist countries as well. Since the time we intensified our relations with the neutral countries, either in the course of the Madrid meeting or on the bilateral level, we too, see a lot of things differently in this regard. For us, it is similarly important to clearly recognize the interests of the neutral countries to understand how they would like Europe to be, and what concrete political line they consider expedient on our part.

In addition to joint actions, we could witness, several times, beneficial individual steps by neutral countries as well. Some initiatives by one of the four States have met with very positive reactions in Budapest. We considered highly positive, for instance, the Kekkonen proposals regarding creation of a Nordic nuclear free zone, Bruno Kreisky's idea of linking European energy systems, Palme's suggestions to create a nuclear free zone in the border areas of the two military alliances in Europe etc. It is not forgotten here that Vienna hosts the MBFR talks (interrupted in 1983) and several other meetings, and that the Austrian capital is going to host the next CSCE follow-up conference. Nor is it forgotten here that Finland provided facilities for the first and third phase of CSCE in 1973 and 1975, that Sweden is offering Stockholm as venue for the CSCE Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament, nor that Switzerland — partly as one of the European centers of the United Nations — is the permanent host to various multilateral and bilateral negotiations. These host functions are obviously not limited to providing technical facilities; in addition, the diplomacy of the above-mentioned host countries has taken an active part in the preparation and organization of the meetings.

Other positive manifestations of the foreign policy of the neutral countries are also well known. It may be recalled here, for instance, that Sweden sharply condemned the US role in the Vietnam war and provided exile for US deserters and that the Sweden had been the first Western country to support the new united Vietnam. Mr. Kreisky's efforts to help ease tensions in the Middle East are also positively evaluated by us.

There can of course be small differences in the foreign policies of the neutral countries. As neutrality is judged from Budapest, it does not mean any uniform foreign policy for all the four countries. In February 1982, for example, Austrian Foreign Minister Willibald Pahr, in his Madrid speech, condemned the sanction policy initiated and applied by some countries against Poland, while other representatives of the neutral States be noted in the interpretations by the neutral countries of the maintenance failed to denounce these actions. Another characteristic difference is to be noted in the interpretations by the neutral countries of the maintenance of the balance between East and West. In his speech at the opening session of the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting, the Swedish delegate, for example, sharply criticized both "superpowers", one for its role in Afghanistan, the other for its role in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, in his opening statement, the Finnish delegate abstained from concrete criticism of either of the Great Powers.

But whatever the differences are in the style of the foreign policies, we are absolutely sure that if continuation of *détente* had depended solely on the neutral States, it could have easily been achieved.

DIE NEUTRALITÄT AUS UNGARISCHER SICHT

LÁSZLÓ VALKI

- 1 Die Differenzen zwischen der österreichischen, schweizerischen, finnischen und schwedischen Neutralität.
- 2 Die öffentliche Meinung in Ungarn über die Neutralität.
- 3 Die bilateralen Beziehungen zwischen Ungarn und der einzelnen neutralen Staaten.
- 4 Die multilateralen Beziehungen der neutralen Staaten.

НЕЙТРАЛИТЕТ С ВЕНГЕРСКОЙ ТОЧКИ ЗРЕНИЯ

ЛАСЛО ВАЛКИ

- 1 Разницы между австрийским, швейцарским, финским и шведским нейтралитетом.
- 2 Общественное мнение в Венгрии о нейтралитете.
- 3 Двусторонние связи между Венгрией и отдельными нейтральными государствами.
- 4 Многосторонние связи нейтральных государств.